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Abstract 
 
There has been substantial public and regulatory attention of late to apparent exploitation 
of conflicts of interest involving financial services firms based on financial market 
imperfections and asymmetric information. This paper proposes a workable taxonomy of 
conflicts of interest in financial services firms, and links it to the nature and scope of 
activities conducted by such firms, including possible compounding of interest-conflicts 
in multifunctional client relationships. It lays out the conditions that either encourage or 
constrain exploitation of conflicts of interest, focusing in particular on the role of 
information asymmetries and market discipline, including the shareholder-impact of 
litigation and regulatory initiatives. External regulation and market discipline are viewed 
as both complements and substitutes – market discipline can leverage the impact of 
external regulatory sanctions, while improving its granularity though detailed 
management initiatives applied under threat of market discipline. At the same time, 
market discipline may help obviate the need for some types of external control of conflict 
of interest exploitation. JEL G21, G24, G28, L14. Keywords: Conflicts of interest. 
Financial regulation. Financial services. Banking. 
 
 
 
 Potential conflicts of interest are a fact of life in financial intermediation. Under 
perfect competition and in the absence of asymmetric information, exploitation of 
conflicts of interest cannot rationally take place. Consequently, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for agency costs associated with conflict of interest exploitation 
center on market and information imperfections. Arguably, the bigger and broader the 
financial intermediaries, the greater the agency problems associated with conflict-of-
interest exploitation.  It follows that efforts to address the issue through improved 
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transparency and market discipline are central to creating viable solutions to a problem 
that repeatedly seems to shake public confidence in financial markets. 
In recent years, the role of banks, securities firms, insurance companies and asset 
managers in alleged conflict-of-interest-exploitation – involving a broad array of abusive 
retail market practices, in acting simultaneously as principals and intermediaries, in 
facilitating various corporate abuses, and in misusing private information – suggests that 
the underlying market imperfections are present even in highly developed financial 
systems. Certainly the prominence of conflict-of-interest problems so soon after the 
passage of the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which removed some of the key 
structural barriers to conflict exploitation built into the US regulatory system for some 66 
years, seems to have surprised many observers.1 
Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the collective decision process in the 
management of major financial firms impairs pinpointing responsible individuals, and 
that criminal indictment of entire firms runs the risk of adverse systemic effects. 
Monetary penalties and negotiated settlements neither admitting nor denying guilt seem 
to have emerged as the principal external mechanisms to address conflict of interest 
exploitation. Market discipline operating through the share price may, under appropriate 
corporate governance, represent an important additional line of defense.  
 Part 1 of this paper proposes a taxonomy of conflicts between the interests of the 
financial firm’s owners and managers and those of its clients, including situations where 
the firm is confronted by conflicts of interest between individual clients or types of 
clients. Some of these conflicts have been discussed extensively in the literature,2 while 
others seem to have surfaced more recently. Mapped onto this taxonomy is the distinction 
between conflicts of interest that arise in wholesale and retail domains, characterized by 
very different degrees of information asymmetry and fiduciary obligations, and conflicts 
that arise on the interface between the two domains. Part 2 of the paper relates this 
conflict-of-interest taxonomy to the strategic profile of financial services firms, linking 
potential conflicts of interest exploitation to the size and breadth of financial firms and 
illustrating how those conflicts can be compounded in large multi-line financial 
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institutions. Part 3 reviews regulatory and market discipline-based constraints on conflict- 
of-interest exploitation, including issues of granularity and immediacy, and considers 
linkages between the two types of constraints. Part 4 presents the conclusions and some 
implications for public policy.  
 
1. A Conflict of Interest Taxonomy 
 There are essentially two types of conflicts of interest confronting firms in the 
financial services industry under market imperfections. 
 Type 1 - Conflicts between a firm’s own economic interests and the interests of its 
clients, usually reflected in the extraction of rents or mispriced transfer of risk. In 
addition to direct firm-client conflicts, indirect conflicts of interest could involve 
collusion between the firm and a fiduciary acting as agent for the ultimate clients.3 
 Type 2 - Conflicts of interest between a firm’s clients, or between types of clients, 
which place the firm in a position of favoring one at the expense of another.4 
 They may arise either in interprofessional activities carried out in wholesale 
financial markets or in activities involving retail clients. The distinction between these 
two market “domains” is important because of the key role of information and 
transactions costs, which differ dramatically between the two broad types of market 
participants. Their vulnerability to conflict-exploitation differs accordingly, and measures 
designed to remedy the problem in one domain may be inappropriate in the other. In 
addition there are what we shall term “transition” conflicts of interest, which run between 
the two domains – and whose impact can be particularly troublesome. In the following 
sections, we enumerate the principal conflicts of interest encountered in financial services 
firms arranged by type and by domain (see Exhibit 1). 
 
Conflicts of Interest in Wholesale Financial Markets 
 In wholesale financial markets involving professional transaction counterparties, 
corporations and sophisticated institutional investors, the asymmetric information and 
competitive conditions necessary for conflicts of interest to be exploited are arguably of 
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relatively limited importance. Caveat emptor and limited fiduciary obligations rule in a 
game that all parties fully understand. Nevertheless, several types of conflicts of interest 
seem to arise. 
 Principal transactions. A financial intermediary may be involved as a principal 
with a stake in a transaction in which it is also serving as adviser, lender or underwriter, 
creating an incentive to put its own interest ahead of those of its clients or trading 
counterparties. Or the firm may engage in misrepresentation beyond the ability of even 
highly capable clients to uncover.5 
 Tying. A financial intermediary may use its lending power to influence a client to 
use its securities or advisory services as well – or the reverse, denying credit to clients 
that refuse to use other (more profitable) services.6 Costs are imposed on the client in the 
form of higher-priced or lower-quality services in an exercise of market power. This 
differs from cross-subsidization, in which a bank (possibly pressured by clients) engages 
in lending on concessionary terms in order to be considered for securities or advisory 
services. There may be good economic reasons for such cross-selling initiatives, whose 
costs are borne by the bank’s own shareholders. The line between tying and cross-selling 
is often blurred,7 and its effectiveness is debatable. In 2003 the Federal Reserve helped to 
clarify the concept of tying, imposing a fine of $3 million on WestLB for violating anti-
tying regulations.8  
 Misuse of fiduciary role. Mutual fund managers who are also competing for 
pension fund mandates from corporations may be hesitant to vote fiduciary shares against 
the management of those companies, to the possible detriment of their own shareholders. 
Or the asset management unit of a financial institution may be pressured by a corporate 
banking client into voting shares in that company for management’s position in a 
contested corporate action such as a proxy battle.9 The potential gain (or avoidance of 
loss) in banking business comes at the potential cost of inferior investment performance 
for the firm’s fiduciary clients, and violates its duty of loyalty.10 
 Board interlocks. The presence of bankers on boards of directors of nonfinancial 
companies may cause various bank functions such as underwriting or equity research to 
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differ from arms-length practice.11 This displacement may impose costs on the bank’s 
shareholders12 or on clients. Although constrained by legal liability issues, director 
interlocks can compound other potential sources of conflict, such as simultaneous 
lending, advisory and fiduciary relationships.13 
 Spinning. Securities firms involved in initial public offerings may allocate shares 
to officers or directors of client firms on the understanding of obtaining future business, 
creating a transfer of wealth to those individuals at the expense of other investors.14 
 Investor loans. In order to ensure that an underwriting goes well, a bank may 
make below-market loans to third-party investors on condition that the proceeds are used 
to purchase securities underwritten by its securities unit. 
 Self-dealing. A multifunctional financial firm may act as trading counterparty for 
its own fiduciary clients, as when the firm’s asset management unit sells or buys 
securities for a fiduciary client while its affiliated broker-dealer is on the other side of the 
trade.15 
 Front-running. Financial firms may exploit institutional, corporate or other 
wholesale clients by executing proprietary trades in advance of client trades that may 
move the market.16 
 All of the foregoing represent exploitation of Type 1 conflicts, which set the 
firm’s own interest against those of its clients in wholesale, interprofessional transactions. 
Type 2 conflicts dealing with differences in the interests of multiple wholesale clients 
seems to center predominantly on two issues: 
 Misuse of private information. As a lender, a bank may obtain certain private 
information about a client. Such proprietary information may be used in ways that harm 
the interests of the client. For instance, it may be used by the bank’s investment banking 
unit in pricing and distributing securities for another client, or in advising another client 
in a contested acquisition.17 
Client interest incompatibility. A financial firm may have a relationship with two 
or more clients who are themselves in conflict. For example, a firm may be asked to 
represent the bondholders of a distressed company and subsequently be offered a 
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 mandate to represent a prospective acquirer of that corporation. Or two rival corporate 
clients may seek to use their leverage to impede each other’s competitive strategies. Or 
firms may underprice IPOs to the detriment of a corporate client in order to create gains 
for institutional investor clients from whom they hope to obtain future trading business.18  
 
Conflicts of Interest in Retail Financial Services 
 Asymmetric information is intuitively a much more important driver of conflict-
of-interest exploitation in retail financial services than in interprofessional wholesale 
financial markets. Retail issues all appear to involve Type 1 conflicts, setting the interests 
of the financial firm against those of its clients. 
 Biased client advice. When financial firms have the power to sell affiliates’ 
products, managers may fail to dispense "dispassionate" advice to clients based on a 
financial stake in promoting high-margin “house” products. Sales incentives may also 
encourage promotion of high-margin third-party products, to the ultimate disadvantage of 
the customer. The incentive structures that underlie such practices are rarely transparent 
to the retail client.19 Even when the firm purports to follow a so-called “open 
architecture” approach to best-in-class product selection, such arrangements normally 
will be confined to suppliers of financial services with whom it has distribution 
agreements.  
 Involuntary cross-selling. Retail clients may be pressured to acquire additional 
financial services on unfavorable terms in order to access a particular product, such as the 
purchase of credit insurance tied to consumer or mortgage loans. Or financial firms with 
discretionary authority over client accounts may substitute more profitable services such 
as low-interest deposit accounts for less profitable services such as higher-interest money 
market accounts, without explicit instructions from the client. 
 Churning. A financial firm that is managing assets for retail or private clients 
may exploit its agency relationship by engaging in excessive trading, which creates 
higher costs and may lead to portfolio suboptimization. Commission-based compensation 
is the usual cause of churning, which can also arise in institutional portfolios – average 
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 US equity mutual fund turnover rose from 17% annually in the 1950s to almost 110% in 
the early 2000s.20 
 Inappropriate margin lending. Clients may be encouraged to leverage their 
investment positions through margin loans from the firm, exposing them to potentially 
unsuitable levels of market risk and high credit costs. Broker incentives tied to stock 
margining usually underlie exploitation of this conflict of interest. 
 Failure to execute. Financial firms may fail to follow client instructions on 
market transactions if doing so benefits the firm. Or payments may be delayed to increase 
the float.21 
 Misleading disclosure and reporting. Financial firms may be reluctant to report 
unfavorable investment performance to clients if doing so threatens to induce outflows of 
assets under management. Whereas a certain degree of puffery in asset management 
performance reviews is normal and expected, there is undoubtedly a “break-point” where 
it becomes exploitive if not fraudulent. 
 Violation of privacy. The complete and efficient use of internal information is 
central to the operation of financial services firms, including such functions as cross-
selling and risk assessment. This may impinge on client privacy concerns or regulatory 
constraints on misuse of personal information, and raises conflict-of-interest issues that 
tend to be increasingly serious as the activity-lines of a particular firm become broader.22 
 
Wholesale-Retail Conflicts 
 Conflicts of interest between the wholesale and retail domains – characterized by 
very different information asymmetries – can be either Type 1 or Type 2, and sometimes 
both at the same time. 
 Suitability. A classic domain-transition conflict of interest exists between a firm’s 
“promotional role” in raising capital for clients in the financial markets and its obligation 
to provide suitable investments for retail clients. Since the bulk of a firm’s earnings 
usually come from capital-raising side, and given the information asymmetries that exist, 
exploiting such conflicts can have adverse consequences for retail investors. 
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  Stuffing. A financial firm that is acting as an underwriter and is unable to place 
the securities in a public offering may seek to ameliorate its exposure to loss by 
allocating unwanted securities to accounts over which it has discretionary authority. 
[Schotland, 1980] This conflict of interest is unlikely to be exploited in the case of 
closely-monitored institutional portfolios in the wholesale domain. But in the absence of 
effective legal and regulatory safeguards, it could be a problem in the case of 
discretionary trust accounts in the retail domain. 
 Conflicted research. Analysts working for multifunctional financial firms wear 
several hats and are subject to multiple conflicts of interest. In such firms, the researcher 
may be required to: (1) Provide unbiased information and interpretation to investors, both 
directly and through retail brokers and institutional sales forces; (2) Assist in raising 
capital for clients in the securities origination and distribution process; (3) Help in 
soliciting and supporting financial and strategic advisory activities centered in corporate 
finance departments; and (4) Support various management and proprietary functions of 
the firm. These diverse roles are fundamentally incompatible, and raise intractable 
agency problems at the level of the individual analyst, the research function, the business 
unit, and the financial firm as a whole. The extent of this incompatibility has been 
reflected, for example, in the post-IPO performance of recommended stocks [Michaely & 
Womack, 1999], contradictory internal communications released in connection with 
regulatory investigations, evidence on researcher compensation, and the underlying 
economics of the equity research function in securities firms.23 Other evidence seems to 
suggest that efforts to exploit this conflict of interest are generally unsuccessful in terms 
of investment banking market share and profitability. [Ljungqvist et al., 2003]  
It is argued that equity research conflicts are among the most intractable. 
Researchers cannot serve the interests of buyers and sellers at the same time. No matter 
how strong the firewalls, as long as research is not profitable purely on the basis of the 
buy-side (e.g., by subscription or pay-per-view), the conflict can only be constrained but 
never eliminated as long as sell-side functions are carried out by the same organization. 
And even if research is purchased from independent organizations, those organizations 
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 could face the same inherent conflicts if they expect to develop further business 
commissioned by their financial intermediary clients.24 
 Market-timing and late-trading. Important clients tend to receive better service 
than others, in the financial services sector as in most others. When such discrimination 
materially damages one client segment to benefit another, however, a conflict of interest 
threshold may be breached and the financial firm’s actions may be considered unethical 
or possibly illegal, with potentially serious consequences for the value of its franchise. 
Such cases came to light in 2003, involving both criminal fraud charges and civil 
settlements regarding “late trading” and “market timing” by hedge funds in the shares of 
mutual funds, shifting returns from ordinary investors to the hedge funds in exchange for 
other business solicited by the mutual fund managers involved.25 
 Laddering. Banks involved in initial public offerings may allocate shares to 
institutional investors who agree to purchase additional shares in the secondary market, 
thereby promoting artificial prices intended to attract additional (usually retail) buyers 
who are unaware of these private commitments.26 A related conflict involves providing 
bank loans to support the price of a security in the aftermarket. [Saunders, 1995] 
 Shifting bankruptcy risk. A bank with credit exposure to a client whose 
bankruptcy risk has increased, to the private knowledge of the banker, may have an 
incentive to assist the corporation in issuing bonds or equities to the general public, with 
the proceeds used to pay-down the bank debt.27 Such behavior can also serve to 
redistribute wealth between different classes of bondholders and equity investors, and 
represents one of the “classic” conflicts of interest targeted by the 1933 separation of 
commercial and investment banking in the United States. 
 
2. Conflicts of Interest and Strategic Profiles of Financial Firms 
 We posit that the broader the activity-range of financial firms in the presence of 
imperfect information, (1) the greater the likelihood that the firm will encounter potential 
conflicts of interest, (2) the higher will be the potential agency costs facing clients, and 
(3) the more difficult and costly will be the internal and external safeguards necessary to 
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 prevent conflict exploitation. If true, competitive consequences associated with conflict-
exploitation can offset the realization of economies of scope in financial services firms. 
Scope economies are intended to generate benefits on the demand side through cross-
selling (revenue synergies) and on the supply side through more efficient use of the 
firm’s business infrastructure (cost synergies). As a result of conflict exploitation the firm 
may initially enjoy revenue and profitability gains at the expense of clients. Subsequent 
adverse legal, regulatory and reputational consequences – along with the managerial and 
operational cost of complexity –  can be considered diseconomies of scope.  
 The potential for conflict-of-interest exploitation in financial firms can be 
depicted in a matrix such as Exhibit 2. The matrix lists on each axis the main types of 
retail and wholesale financial services, as well as infrastructure services such as 
clearance, settlement and custody. Cells in the matrix represent potential conflicts of 
interest. Some of these conflicts are basically intractable, and remediation may require 
changes in organizational structure. Others can be managed by appropriate changes in 
incentives, functional separation of business lines, or internal compliance initiatives. Still 
others may not be sufficiently serious to worry about. And in some cases it is difficult to 
imagine conflicts of interest arising at all. 
 For example, in Exhibit 2 cell D is unlikely to encompass activities that pose 
serious conflicts of interest. Others cells, such as C, have traditionally been ring-fenced 
using internal compliance systems. Still others such as B and E can be handled by 
assuring adequate transparency. But there are some, such as A, which have created major 
difficulties in particular circumstances (such as advising on a hostile takeover when the 
target is a banking client), and for which easy answers seem elusive.  
 
Potential Conflicts of Interest in Multifunctional Client Relationships 
 The foregoing discussion suggests that conflicts of interest are essentially two-
dimensional – either between the interests of the firm and those of its client (Type 1), or 
between clients in conflict with one another (Type 2). They can also be multidimensional, 
however, spanning a number of different stakeholders and conflicts at the same time. 
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 Exhibits 3 and 4 provide two examples from the rich array of corporate scandals that 
emerged during 2001-2003.  
 In the Merrill Lynch - Enron case (Exhibit 3), a broker-dealer was actively 
involved in structuring and financing an off-balance-sheet special-purpose entity (LJM2), 
which conducted energy trades with Enron and whose CEO was simultaneously Enron’s 
CFO. Merrill was both a lender to and an investor in LJM2 – as were a number of senior 
Merrill executives and unaffiliated private and institutional investors advised by the firm. 
Merrill also structured a repurchase transaction for Enron involving a number of barges 
in Nigeria. Allegedly, the sole purpose of the highly profitable LJM2 and Nigerian barge 
transactions was to misrepresent Enron’s financials to the market.28  
 At the same time, Merrill performed a range of advisory and underwriting 
services for Enron, provided equity analyst coverage, and was one of Enron’s principal 
derivatives trading counterparties. Conflicts of interest in this case involved Merrill and 
Enron shareholders, investors in Enron and LJM2 debt, Merrill executives, as well as 
unaffiliated institutional and private shareholders in the LJM2 limited partnership.  
Such structures were instrumental in Enron’s 2001 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, 
with pre-petition on- and off-balance sheet liabilities exceeding $60 billion. [Batson, 
2003b] As a consequence, the financial firms that helped design and execute them (and in 
some cases actively marketed them to other clients) have been in the regulatory spotlight. 
In July 2003 JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup agreed to pay $192.5 million and $126.5 
million, respectively, in fines and penalties (without admitting or denying guilt) to settle 
SEC and Manhattan District Attorney charges of financial fraud, which in turn 
encouraged civil suits and risked some of the banks’ Enron loans with “equitable 
subordination” in the Enron bankruptcy proceedings.29 
 In the Citigroup - WorldCom case (Exhibit 4), a global financial conglomerate 
was serving simultaneously as equity analyst supplying assessments of WorldCom to 
institutional and (through the firm’s brokers) retail clients while advising WorldCom 
management on strategic and financial matters, at times participating in board meetings. 
As a major telecommunications-sector commercial and investment banking client, 
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 WorldCom maintained an active credit relationship with Citigroup and provided 
substantial securities underwriting business. Citigroup also served as the exclusive 
pension fund adviser to WorldCom and executed significant stock option trades for 
WorldCom executives as the options vested (having also advised them to reinvest 
dividends in WorldCom shares), while at the same time conducting proprietary trading in 
WorldCom stock. Simultaneous conflict of interest vectors in this instance relate to retail 
investors, institutional fund managers, WorldCom executives, and WorldCom 
shareholders as well as Citigroup’s own positions in WorldCom lending exposure and 
stock trades prior to its $103 billion (pre-petition liabilities) bankruptcy in 2002. 
 Such examples suggest that the broader the range of services that a financial firm 
provides to an individual client in the market, the greater the possibility that conflicts of 
interest will be compounded in any given case, and (arguably) the more likely they are to 
damage the market value of the financial firm’s business franchise once they come to 
light. 
 
3. Constraining Exploitation of Conflicts of Interest 
 From a public policy perspective, efforts to address exploitation of conflicts of 
interest in the financial services sector should logically focus on improving market 
efficiency and transparency. Compelling arguments have been made that regulation can 
materially improve the efficiency of financial systems. The greater the information 
asymmetries and transaction-cost inefficiencies that exist (inefficiencies that are at the 
core of the conflict-of-interest issue), the greater is the potential gain from regulation that 
addresses these inefficiencies. [Kane, 1987]  In the United States, periodic efforts in this 
direction go back almost a century, often in response to perceived market abuses. A 
recent example is SEC Regulation FD (“fair disclosure”) of 1999, governing the flow of 
corporate information to the financial markets, with a clear potential for ameliorating 
certain conflicts of interest.   
 Nonetheless, the history of US and other relatively well-developed financial 
markets chronicles a litany of conflict-of-interest exploitation involving all of the major-
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 bracket US securities firms, four of the top-six UK merchant banks (prior to their 
acquisition by larger financial firms), all of the major Japanese securities houses, as well 
as various commercial banks, asset managers, insurance companies and financial 
conglomerates.30  So what is left of market imperfections and information asymmetries, 
even under intense competition and regulatory oversight, appears to allow plenty of scope 
for persistent conflict exploitation on the part of financial intermediaries. It suggests a 
continuing role for external control through firm-specific regulation and market discipline 
and internal control through improved corporate governance, incentive structures, and 
compliance initiatives. 
 
Regulation-Based Constraints 
 The regulatory overlay of the financial services sector can be conveniently 
depicted in terms such as Exhibit 5. The right-hand side of the diagram identifies the 
classic policy tradeoffs that confront the design and implementation of a properly 
structured financial system. On the one hand, financial regulation must strive to achieve 
maximum static and dynamic efficiency. This implies low levels regulation consistent 
with a competitive market structure, creating sustained pressure on financial 
intermediaries to achieve operating cost and revenue efficiencies, and to innovate. On the 
other hand, regulation must safeguard the stability of, and confidence in, the financial 
system and its institutions. Safety-net design is subject to well-known difficulties such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection, and can become especially problematic when 
different types of financial services shade into each other, when on- and off-balance sheet 
activities are involved, when some of the regulated firms are multifunctional financial 
conglomerates, and when business is conducted across national and functional regulatory 
regimes and may exploit “fault lines” between them. 
 Regulators continuously face the possibility that “inadequate” regulation will 
result in costly failures, on the one hand, and on the other hand the possibility that 
“overregulation” will create opportunity costs in the form of financial efficiencies not 
achieved (which by definition cannot be measured). Since any improvements in financial 
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 stability can only be calibrated in terms of damage that did not occur and external costs 
that were successfully avoided, the argumentation surrounding financial regulation is 
invariably based on “what if” hypotheticals. In effect, regulators face the daunting task of 
balancing the unmeasurable against the unknowable.  
 The principal tools depicted in Exhibit 5 that regulators have at their disposal 
include (1) “Fitness and properness” criteria, under which a financial institution are 
chartered and allowed to operate, (2) Frequency and speed of financial reporting, (3) 
Line-of-business regulation as to what types activities financial institutions may engage 
in, (4) Adequacy of capital and liquidity, (5) Limits on various types of exposures, and 
(6) Rules governing valuation of assets and liabilities. But regulatory initiatives can 
easily create financial market distortions of their own, which can become problematic 
when financial products and processes evolve rapidly and the regulator can easily get one 
or two steps behind. 
A third issue depicted in Exhibit 5 involves the regulatory machinery itself, 
including self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and public oversight by regulators with 
civil and criminal enforcement powers. The proper role of SROs is often debated, 
especially when there are clear abuses in financial markets.31 “Regulatory capture” is a 
perennial problem with SROs, suggesting greater reliance on public-oversight for 
financial regulation. But this too is subject to regulatory capture, since virtually any 
regulatory initiative is likely to confront powerful vested interests attempting to bend the 
rules in their favor [Kane, 1987; White, 1991].  
 Further tradeoffs are encountered between regulatory and supervisory 
alternatives. Some regulatory techniques  (for example, capital adequacy rules) are fairly 
easy to supervise but full of distortive potential given to their broad-gauge nature. Others 
(for example, fitness and properness criteria) may be cost-effective but difficult to 
supervise. Some supervisory techniques involve higher compliance costs than others. 
Regulators must deal with these tradeoffs under conditions of ongoing market and 
industry change, blurred institutional and activity demarcations, and functional as well as 
cross-border regulatory fault-lines. 
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  Within this setting, regulatory control of conflicts of interest tends to be applied 
through both SROs and public agencies, and is generally anchored in banking, insurance, 
securities, and consumer protection legislation that is supposed to govern market 
practices. Its failure to prevent serious exploitation of conflicts of interest came into 
particularly sharp relief in the US during the early 2000s with serial revelations of 
misconduct by financial intermediaries. Most of the regulatory initiatives in these cases 
were taken not by the responsible SROs or by the national regulators, but by the New 
York State Attorney General under the Martin Act, a 1921 state law which was aimed at 
securities fraud, survived all subsequent banking and securities legislation, and was 
bolstered in 1955 with criminal penalties.32 The de facto ceding of enforcement actions 
by the SROs and the SEC to a state prosecutor (later joined by several others) focused 
attention on gaps in external regulation and led to a burst of activity by the SEC, the 
NYSE, the NASD, and the Congress, including the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and 
the 2003 $1.4 billion “Global Settlement” with 12 major banks and securities firms.  
 Both the Martin Act prosecutions and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation appear 
flawed. The “Global Settlement” allowed financial firms to settle without determination 
of guilt or innocence, thereby creating no new legal ground.33 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was drafted in haste and quickly triggered unintended consequences, including 
international regulatory repercussions and extraordinarily high compliance costs for 
financial intermediaries and their clients. 
 
Market-Discipline Constraints 
 If external regulatory constraints on conflict-of-interest exploitation are frequently 
politicized and difficult to devise, calibrate and bring to bear on specific problems 
without collateral damage, what is the alternative? As a general matter, it can be argued 
that regulatory constraints and litigation are relatively blunt instruments in dealing with 
exploitation of conflicts of interest in financial firms, conflicts that are often extremely 
granular and sometimes involve conduct that is “inappropriate” or “unethical” rather than 
“illegal.” So the impact of conflict exploitation on the market value of a financial firm 
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 may provide a more consistent, incentive-compatible and durable basis for firm-specific, 
internal defenses against exploitation of conflicts of interest. Here we shall argue that 
constraints on conflicts of interest that are rooted in market discipline can be substantially 
more cost-effective and surgical than constraints based on external regulation. Given the 
persistence of market inefficiencies and information asymmetries they can, acting in 
combination, have powerful deterrent effects on conflict of interest exploitation.   
 Revenues. Exploitation of conflicts of interest, whether or not they violate legal 
and regulatory constraints, can have a powerful reputation effect, leading to revenue 
erosion as clients defect to competitors. In the case of Bankers Trust’s 1995 exploitation 
of conflicts of interest in derivatives trading with Procter & Gamble Inc. and Gibson 
Greetings Inc., revenue losses from client defections dwarfed the $300 million in 
customer restitution the firm was forced to pay. It left the firm mortally wounded, 
subsequently to be acquired by Deutsche Bank AG in 1999. In the case of conflict-of-
interest exploitation at Arthur Andersen in 2002, reputation losses and client defections 
virtually assured the liquidation of the firm well before its indictment and conviction on 
criminal charges 
 Costs. Increased regulatory pressure and market-impacts of conflict exploitation 
can jointly force the creation of a robust compliance infrastructure and other managerial 
safeguards that may reduce operating efficiency. This includes organizational changes 
and separation of functions that may impair realization of revenue economies of scope. 
Compliance itself is an expensive business in terms of direct outlays as well as separation 
of business units by “Chinese walls” or into distinct legal entities, which can erode 
operating efficiency. Also on the cost side is the impact of regulatory penalties in civil 
and criminal litigation and class action settlements.34 
 Risks. The likelihood of exploitation of conflicts of interest and its consequences 
clearly is incorporated in the valuation of financial firms in the marketplace. A high 
degree of sensitivity to conflict exploitation and its revenue and cost impacts should be 
associated with greater earnings volatility and a lower share price, all else equal. 
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  How these three factors may come together to damage a firm’s market value can 
be illustrated by a 1993 case, depicted in Exhibit 6, in which J.P. Morgan simultaneously 
acted as commercial banker, investment banker, and adviser to Banco Español de Crédito 
(Banesto) in Spain, as well as serving as an equity investor and fund manager for co-
investors in a limited partnership (the Corsair Fund, L.P.) holding shares in the firm.  
Additionally, Morgan’s Vice Chairman served on Banesto’s Supervisory Board. The 
potential conflicts of interest imbedded in the complex relationship may have affected the 
Morgan stock price immediately after the Bank of Spain, concerned about a possible 
Banesto collapse, announced a takeover of the bank on December 28, 1993.35 Abnormal 
returns attributable to the Banesto event for JP Morgan shareholders represented a 
cumulative loss of about 10% of the market value of equity at the time, a drop in JP 
Morgan market capitalization of approximately $1.5 billion as against a maximum direct 
after-tax loss of about $10 million. [DeLong and Walter 1993]. This is consistent with the 
findings of an earlier event study by Smith [1992] of the Salomon Brothers Treasury 
bond auction scandal in 1991, which was associated with a one-third share price drop and 
contributed to Salomon’s ultimate absorption by Travelers, Inc.36 
 Another set of market-based constraints on the exploitation of conflicts of interest 
relies on the negotiation of improved contracts between financial intermediaries and their 
clients. Examples include broker compensation not based on commissions, IFA fees paid 
directly by clients, and IPO underwriting compensation that is sensitive to the issuer’s 
valuation.37 
 
Intersection of Regulation and Market-Based Constraints 
One can therefore argue that regulation-based and market-based external controls, 
through the corporate governance process, create the basis for internal controls which can 
be either prohibitive (as reflected in Chinese walls and compliance systems, for example) 
or affirmative, involving the behavioral “tone” and incentives set by senior management 
together with reliance on the loyalty and professional conduct of employees. The more 
complex the financial services organization – perhaps most dramatically in the case of 
 17 
 global financial services conglomerates, where comprehensive regulatory insight is 
implausible – the greater the challenge of sensible conflict-of-interest regulation, 
suggesting greater reliance on the role of market discipline. The logic runs as follows:
 First, market discipline can leverage the effectiveness of regulatory actions.38 
When they are announced -- and especially when they are amplified through aggressive 
investigative reporting by independent media -- regulatory actions can have a serious 
adverse effect on a financial firm’s share price as well as its debt rating. In turn, this 
affects its cost of capital, its ability to make strategic acquisitions, its vulnerability to 
takeover, and management compensation. Such effects simply reflect the market’s 
response to the prospective impact of regulatory actions on revenues, costs (including 
derivative civil litigation) and exposure to risk.39 Assuming appropriate corporate 
governance, boards and managements should be sensitive both to regulatory constraints 
and prospective market-reactions with regard to exploitation of conflicts of interest. That 
is, they should be aware that violations of regulatory constraints designed to limit 
conflict-of-interest exploitation may be greatly amplified by market reactions – in the 
extreme including absorption by other firms, breakup, or bankruptcy.40 This awareness 
ought to be reflected in compensation arrangements as well as in the firm’s 
organizational structure.   
 Second, even in the absence of explicit legal or regulatory constraints, actions that 
are widely considered to be “unfair” or “unethical” or that otherwise violate accepted 
behavioral norms will tend to trigger market discipline. In a competitive context, this will 
affect firm valuation through the revenue and risk dimensions in particular. Avoiding 
conflict of interest exploitation is likely to reinforce the value of the firm as a going 
concern and, with properly structured incentives, management’s own compensation. In a 
firm well known for tying managers’ remuneration closely to the share price, Citigroup 
CEO Sanford Weill in 2002 noted in a message to employees “There are industry 
practices that we should all be concerned about, and although we have found nothing 
illegal, looking back, we can see that certain of our activities do not reflect the way we 
believe business should be done. That should never be the case, and I’m sorry for that.”41 
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  Third, since they tend to be more granular and provide constant reinforcement in 
metrics that managers can understand (market share, profitability, and the stock price) 
market discipline constraints can reach the more opaque areas of conflict-of-interest 
exploitation, and deal with those issues as they occur in real time, which external 
regulation normally cannot do. 
 Fourth, since external regulation bearing on conflicts of interest tends to be linked 
to information asymmetries and transaction costs, it should logically differentiate 
between the wholesale and retail domains, discussed earlier. Often this is not feasible, 
resulting in overregulation in some areas and underregulation in others. Market 
discipline-based constraints can help alleviate this problem by permitting lower overall 
levels of regulation and bridging fault-lines between wholesale and retain financial 
market domains. Few things are as reputation-sensitive as hawking the “risk-free” rump-
ends of structured asset-backed securities deals -- so-called “toxic waste” -- to retirees in 
trailer homes trying to make ends meet. Moreover, just as market discipline can reinforce 
the effectiveness of regulation, it can also serve as a precursor of sensible regulatory 
change. 
 Finally, market structure and competition between strategic groups of financial 
firms can help reinforce the effectiveness of market discipline. For example, private 
information accessible to a bank as lender to a corporate acquisition target would almost 
certainly preclude its affiliated investment banking unit from acting as an adviser to a 
potential acquirer. An entrepreneur may not want his or her private banking affairs 
handled by a bank that also controls his or her business financing. A broker may be 
encouraged by a firm’s compensation arrangements to sell in-house mutual funds or 
externally-managed funds with high fees under “revenue-sharing” arrangements, as 
opposed to funds that would better suit the client’s needs.42 Market discipline that helps 
avoid exploitation of such conflicts may be weakened if most of the competition is 
coming from a monoculture of similarly-structured firms which face precisely the same 
issues. But if the playing field is also populated by a mixed bag of aggressive insurance 
companies, commercial banks, thrifts, broker-dealers, fund managers, and other 
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 “monoline” specialists, market discipline may be much more effective – assuming 
competitors can break through the fog of asymmetric information. 
 
Conclusions 
 Based on a taxonomy of potential conflicts of interest in financial services firms, 
how these conflicts relate to their strategic positioning, and the conditions that underlie 
their exploitation, we conclude that market discipline -- though the reputation-effects on 
the franchise value of financial intermediaries -- can be a powerful complement to and 
potential substitute for external regulation.   
 Firms can benefit from conflict-exploitation in the short term, to the extent that 
business volumes and/or margins are increased as a result. On the other hand, reputation 
losses associated with conflict-exploitation can cause serious damage, as demonstrated by 
repeated “accidents,” and contribute to weaker market valuations among the most 
exposed financial services firms. The fact that such events repeat with some regularity 
suggests that market discipline is no panacea – for reasons that include lapses in 
corporate governance among financial services firms themselves. 
 In the end, management of such firms must be convinced that a good defense is as 
important as a good offense in determining sustainable competitive performance. This is 
something that is extraordinarily difficult to put into practice in a ruthlessly competitive 
environment, and seems to require an unusual degree of senior management leadership 
and commitment. [Smith and Walter, 1997] Internally, there have to be mechanisms that 
reinforce the loyalty and professional conduct of employees -- conflict management is a 
costly and complicated (non-revenue-generating) business, quite apart from the various 
types of walls between business units and functions that inhibit efficient use of 
proprietary information. Externally, there has to be careful and sustained management 
attention to reputation and competition as disciplinary mechanisms. 
 Market discipline is an often-overlooked sanction. It greatly reinforces regulatory 
mechanisms, particularly when there are too-big-to-fail considerations and constraints on 
criminal prosecution. In turn, it relies on a favorable legal framework, including 
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 controversial elements such as the Martin Act and class action litigation. Alongside 
measures to improve transparency and market efficiency, an important public policy 
objective is to make market discipline more effective, notably through better corporate 
governance and internal reward systems more closely aligned to the interests of 
shareholders. Still, “accidents” will continue to happen, sometimes repeatedly and 
sometimes repeatedly within the same firm. There is no panacea. Nirvana is too 
expensive. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1 Public accounting firms and law firms have been the subject of serious conflict of interest allegations as 
well, but are considered here as part of the market infrastructure, as opposed to serving as direct 
participants in the financial intermediation function. 
 
2See for example Edwards [1979], Saunders [1985], and Rajan [1996]. A general survey of the literature on 
corporate conflicts of interest is presented by Demski [2003]. 
 
3 An example would be collusion between financial firms and pension trustees to the ultimate detriment of 
pension beneficiaries. Cases involving Orange County, California derivatives exposures and “pay to play” 
municipal bond scandals involving the State of Massachusetts come to mind. See Smith and Walter [1997] 
Here the solutions would seem to involve writing better contracts between the clients and their agents 
through reform of state and local political processes. 
 
4Firm behavior that systematically favors corporate clients over retail investors in the presence of 
asymmetric information is a prominent example of this type of conflict. 
 
5 The classic case involves complex Bankers Trust’s derivative transactions with Procter & Gamble Inc. 
and Gibson Greetings Inc. in 1995, which triggered major damage to the Bank’s franchise, key executive 
changes, and made the Bank a takeover target.. 
6A 2002 survey of corporations with more than $1 billion in annual sales found that 56% of  firms that 
refused to buy fee-based bank services had their credit restricted or lending terms altered adversely, and 
83% of the surveyed CFOs expected adverse consequences should they refuse to buy non-credit services. 
[Association for Financial Professionals, 2003]. 
7In the United States the first type of linkage is prohibited under the anti-tying provisions of the Bank 
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, while reducing the 
price of credit to benefit an investment banking affiliate violates  Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 
However, the courts have generally upheld allegations of tying only where abuse of market power has been 
demonstrated. Since anti-trust cases in wholesale banking are difficult to make in light of the industry’s 
competitive structure, very few allegations of tying have been found to violate the law. Tying can also have 
some perverse competitive consequences. [Stefanadis , 2003] There are no prohibitions on tying bank 
lending to trust services, deposit balances, etc. and investment banks are in any case exempt from anti-tying 
constraints and have actively used senior debt to obtain fee-based business. For a review, see Litan [2003]. 
 
8Banks may not use their lending power “in a coercive manner” to sell non-lending services, although they 
may link lending and non-lending services when clients seek such “bundling.” Even so, they cannot tie a 
given loan to a given non-lending product without allowing the client “meaningful choice.” In the WestLB 
case, the bank required participation in debt underwriting as a condition of lending in a series of structured 
finance transactions. See “Fed Fines WestLB $3m for ‘Tying’ Loans to Products,” Financial Times, August 
28, 2008. 
9Example: The 2001-02 Hewlett-Packard Co.  effort  to acquire Compaq Computer Corp. was bitterly 
opposed by the son of one of the co-founders, William R. Hewlett. Hewlett assembled sufficient backing to 
force the contest down to the wire. H-P began to lobby one of the large institutional shareholders – the 
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investment arm of Deutsche Bank AG, which had opposed the merger – to change its vote. Other Deutsche 
Bank units, notably the corporate finance division, favored H-P in the merger. But the Chinese wall 
between the dealmakers and the asset managers apparently held firm. Shortly before the proxy vote, H-P 
CEO Carly Fiorina was quoted as saying “...we need a definite answer from the [Deutsche Bank] Vice 
Chairman, and if it’s the wrong one, we need to swing into action.... See what we can get, but we may have 
to do something extraordinary to bring them over the line here.” [Burrows, 2003] Deutsche then set up 
meetings with both H-P and Walter Hewlett and, after some heated internal debate, changed its votes in 
favor of H-P.  The vote-switch, along with a similar story at Northern Trust Co., was investigated by the 
SEC and the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The SEC fined Deutsche Bank 
$570,000 in July 2003 for not disclosing its conflict of interest in the matter. See Deborah Solomon and 
Pui-Wing Tam, “Deutsche Bank Unit is Fined Over H-P,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2003. 
10In a very different example, prior to WorldCom’s 2002 bankruptcy filing the investment banking unit of  
Citigroup was the lead advisor and banker to the firm. Citigroup also served as the exclusive administrator 
of the WorldCom executive stock option plan. Executive stock options were generally exercised early in 
January, and the firm’s fund administrators allegedly passed information on their size and timing to 
Citigroup’s equity trading desk, allowing traders to front-run the WorldCom executives’ transactions. 
[Morgenson, 2001]  
11A high-profile case emerged in 2002, when a member of the ATT Board, Citigroup Chairman and CEO 
Sanford Weil allegedly urged the firm’s telecom analyst, Jack Grubman, to rethink his negative views on 
the company’s stock – ATT CEO Michael Armstrong also served on the Citigroup Board. ATT shares were 
subsequently up-rated by Grubman, and Citigroup coincidentally was mandated to co-manage an issue of 
ATT Wireless tracking stock. Grubman down-rated ATT again not long thereafter, and Weill himself 
narrowly averted being named in subsequent regulatory investigations of the case. See Schiesel and 
Morgenson [2002]. 
12For shareholders these costs in the United States could come through the legal doctrines of “equitable 
subordination” and “lender liability” in case of financial distress, which must be offset against the 
relationship-related and private-information benefits that board membership may contribute. This is given 
as a reason why bankers tend to be present mainly on the boards of large, stable corporations with low 
bankruptcy risk. [Krozner and Strahan, 1999]  
13For example, of the ten largest US nonfinancial corporations (by market capitalization) in 2002, 7 had 
senior bankers or former bank CEOs on their boards in 2002. [Corporate Library, 2003]. 
 
14In the literature, see Ritter and Welch [2002];  Loughran and Ritter [2002]. 
15The 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the US bars transactions between asset 
management units of financial firms that are fiduciaries for defined-benefit pension plans and affiliated 
broker-dealers, despite possible costs in terms of best-execution. [Saunders et al., 2001] Trades between US 
mutual funds and affiliated securities units of the fund management firm must be fully disclosed. 
16Example: In April 2003 investigations by the SEC and the NYSE were aimed at floor specialists allegedly 
violating their “negative obligation” or “affirmative obligation” in assuring fair and orderly markets in 
listed securities, and instead “trading ahead” of customer orders. Included in the 2003 investigation were 
specialist affiliates of major financial firms including FleetBoston Financial Group, Goldman Sachs Group 
and Bear Stearns Cos. [Kelly and Craig, 2003] All were heavily fined by the NYSE  in October 2003. 
Criminal front-running charges had previously been filed by the NASD in 1998 against Spear, Leeds & 
Kellogg (prior to its acquisition by Goldman Sachs) by the NASD for intentionally delayed trade reporting 
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and was again fine in 2003 by the American Stock Exchange for trading misconduct during the years 1999-
2002. 
 
17Examples: In 2003 Dana Corp. sued to prevent UBS from advising on a hostile bid by ArvinMeritor 
Corp. on grounds of “breach of duty” and “breach of contract” due to the bank’s relationship with Dana. 
UBS argued that its ArvinMeritor relationship predated its relationship with Dana, which in any case was 
non-exclusive. See “UBS Sued Over Role in Bitter Battle,” Financial Times, August 6, 2003.  In a classic 
case that emerged in 1988, Sterling Drug Company was the object of a hostile takeover bid by F. Hoffmann 
La Roche of Switzerland, advised at the time by J.P. Morgan, which also had a banking relationship with 
Sterling. During the three-week battle, Sterling blasted Morgan for providing investment banking services 
to Roche. CEO John M. Pietruski sent a letter to Morgan Chairman Lewis T. Preston indicating that he was 
shocked and dismayed by what he considered to be Morgan's unethical conduct in aiding and abetting a 
surprise raid on one of its longtime clients. Morgan, he suggested, was "privy to our most confidential 
financial information," including shareholder lists, and asked "How many relationships of trust and 
confidence do you have to have with a client before you consider not embarking on a course of action that 
could be detrimental to [its] best interest?" The Sterling chairman said his company was reviewing "all our 
dealings" with Morgan, and intended to "bring the matter to the attention" of other Morgan clients. See “A 
Picture Perfect Rescue,” Time, February 1, 1988. 
18In 2003 revelations, some investor clients (mainly hedge funds) appear to have kicked-back a significant 
part of their IPO gains to the underwriting firms in the form of excessive commissions on unrelated 
secondary market trades. [Attorney General of the State of New York, 2003]. 
 
19Following SEC, NASD and Massachusetts securities regulators investigations of its mutual fund sales 
practices, civil charges were settled in September 2003 by Morgan Stanley in connection with the use of 
sales contests to sell in-house back-end loaded funds -- in direct violation of 1999 rules barring such 
practices. The firm was fined $2 million in the matter. See  “Morgan Stanley to Face Charges Over 
Contest,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2003; and “Morgan Stanley Fined Over Mutual Funds,” 
Financial Times, September 17, 2003. 
 
20John C. Bogle, “Mutual Fund Directors: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,” Vanguard, January 28, 2001. 
21The brokerage firm of E.F. Hutton was criminally indicted for check kiting in 1985, and subsequently was 
absorbed by Shearson Lehman Bros. Regulatory enforcement in the brokerage industry tightly 
circumscribes failure to execute. 
22 The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act eliminating functional barriers for US financial services firms 
contains privacy safeguards with respect to sharing personal information with outside firms, but not intra-
firm sharing among banking, brokerage, asset management and insurance affiliates. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970 (as amended in 1996) allows sharing of certain data within multifunctional financial 
firms. This issue is complicated in the US by state blue-sky laws versus federal authority, “opt-in” versus 
“opt-out” alternatives with respect to client actions, the need to track credit histories, and efforts to combat 
identity theft. 
23 Firms argue, for instance,  that expensive research functions cannot be paid for by attracting investor 
deal-flow and brokerage commissions, so that corporate finance and other functions must  cover much of 
the cost. Moreover, researcher compensation levels -- far in excess of anything that could possibly be 
explained by incremental buy-side revenues at prevailing highly competitive commission rates -- provide 
inferential evidence for the agency problems involved. 
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24 There is some evidence that high-quality buy-side equity research is increasingly to be found in small, 
sector-specialized boutiques, and that institutional investors are willing to pay hard money for that research. 
If this business model proves to be viable, and if brokers are willing to source the same research for their 
retail clients, it could provide to be a useful-market-based approach to the conflicted research problem. 
 
25 One hedge fund reached a $40 million settlement with the New York State Attorney General, basically a 
disgorgement of illicit profits from “late trading” in shares of mutual funds managed by Bank of America, 
Strong Capital Management, BancOne, Janus Capital Group, Prudential Securities and Alliance Capital 
Management (AXA Financial) – altogether representing 287 mutual funds with $227 billion in assets under 
management. Late trading allowed the hedge fund to execute trades at 4 pm daily closing net asset values 
(NAV) as late as 9 pm, enabling the hedge fund to profit from news released during the interval. Other fund 
investors were obliged to trade at the opening NAV on the following day. The practice transferred wealth 
from ordinary shareholders to the hedge fund in question. Various responsible executives were fired. An 
employee of Bank of America was indicted on criminal securities fraud charges while a hedge fund 
manager pleaded guilty of criminal violations. The investigation also uncovered “market timing” in mutual 
fund shares -- a practice usually prohibited in fund prospectuses -- involving rapid-fire trading by hedge 
funds in shares of international mutual funds across time-zones, for example, a practice that increases 
mutual fund expenses which have to be borne by all investors, not just the market-timers. In some of the 
revelations the mutual fund management companies facilitated market-timing trades by revealing to the 
hedge funds the portfolio weights (allowing them to take short positions) as well as providing direct-access 
terminals. See “Ex-Broker Charges in Criminal Fraud Case,” New York Times, 28 September 2003; and 
“Fund Probe Reaches Prudential,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2003. 
 
26 In October 2003, for example, J.P. Morgan settled SEC charges with a $25 million fine in one of several 
laddering allegations against IPO underwriters, supported by e-mail evidence suggesting a  quid pro quo 
linking IPO allocations to aftermarket purchases at specific stock price targets. In fact, the case was brought 
under relatively obscure SEC Regulation M, Rule 101, a technical violation of securities underwriting 
procedures, as opposed to the more severe Securities Act Rule 10b-5, which covers securities fraud.  
27For example, in 1995 Den Danske Bank underwrote a secondary equity issue of the Hafnia Insurance 
Group, stock which was heavily distributed to retail investors, with the proceeds being used to pay-down 
the bank’s loans to Hafnia even as the insurer slid into bankruptcy. The case came before the Danish courts 
in a successful investor litigation supported by the government -- for a discussion, see Smith and Walter 
[1997]. Historically, there appears to be little evidence that this potential conflict of interest has in fact been 
exploited, at least in the United States. During the 1927-29 period investors actually paid higher prices for 
bonds underwritten by commercial banks subject to this potential conflict of interest than from independent 
securities firms, and such bonds also had lower default rates. [Puri, 1994] The same finding appeared in the 
1990s, when commercial bank affiliates were permitted to underwrite corporate bonds under Section 20 of 
the Glass-Steagall Act prior to its repeal in 1999. [Gande  et al., 1997]. The reason may be that information 
emanating from the credit relationship allows more accurate pricing, less costly underwriting and 
reinforced investor confidence. [Puri 1996, Gande et al., 1999]. 
28See Healy & Palepu [2003]. In the case of Enron’s Mahonia Ltd. special-purpose entity, J.P. Morgan 
Chase in 2003 agreed to pay a fine of $25 million to avoid prosecution on criminal charges in a settlement 
with the New York District Attorney under the 1921 Martin Act. A criminal indictment would have 
terminated a broad array of fiduciary relationships and triggered large-scale client defections, possibly 
endangering the continued viability of the bank.  
29According to the initial report of Enron bankruptcy examiner Neal Batson  [2003a], Citigroup alone was 
involved in over $3.83 billion in Enron financing, including “prepays” and other questionable transactions. 
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The final report [Batson 2003b] concluded that both Citigroup and JP Morgan (1) “…had actual knowledge 
of the wrongful conduct of these transactions;”  (2) Helped structure, promote, fund and implement 
transactions designed solely to materially misrepresent Enron’s financials; and (3) Caused significant harm 
to other creditors of Enron.  
 
30 For a chronology, see Smith and Walter [1997]. 
 
31 Examples: (1) In 1994 the UK Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), which 
regulates pension funds, failed to catch the disappearance of pension assets from Robert Maxwell’s Mirror 
Group Newspapers PLC. The UK Personal Investment Authority (PIA) for years failed to act against 
deceptive insurance sales practices. (2) In 1996 NASDAQ, one of the key US markets regulated by the 
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), and some of its member firms were assessed heavy 
monetary penalties in connection with rigging OTC equity markets, eventually leading to important 
changes in regulatory and market practices. (3) In 2001 Moody’s (which, along with other rating agencies, 
is increasingly a part of the regulatory infrastructure) pleaded guilty to criminal charges of obstruction of 
justice in connection with an SEC investigation of the firm’s unsolicited ratings practices. (4) And in 2003 
the New York Stock Exchange faced a series of governance issues including the composition of its board, 
remuneration of its CEO, and alleged conflict of interest exploitation by specialists central to its trading 
system. 
 
32 The Act contains extremely broad “fraud” provisions and conveys unusually wide discovery and 
subpoena power, but had been largely dormant until the 2001-02 revelations of the excesses in market 
practices and corporate governance failures. 
 
33 The SEC, supported by lobbyists for financial intermediaries, was quick to promote legislation to strip 
state securities regulators and prosecutors of the authority to pursue future malfeasance or impose rules on 
the capital markets, specifically including conflict of interest requirements -- the Securities Fraud 
Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003. The SEC clearly felt the need to regain the initiative in 
regulation of national financial markets, and followed with a series of draft proposals that would simplify 
conflict of interest rules. 
 
34 Probably the leading example is the aforementioned $1.4 billion “global settlement” between the 
regulators and major banks and securities firms involving various allegations of conflicts of interest, as well 
as smaller amounts of $100 million each that had previously been assessed against Merrill Lynch and 
CSFB. In turn, financial firms provisioned well over $5 billion to cover hundreds of civil cases filed against 
them alleging conflicts of interest in financial market practices and aiding and abetting financial fraud. 
 
35 Banesto’s CEO, Mario Condé was later convicted on charges of financial fraud and imprisoned. 
 
36 More recent examples that are less amenable to event study methodology are precipitous declines during 
2002 in Merrill Lynch and Citigroup share prices relative to cohorts immediately following release of new 
information regarding exploitation of analyst conflicts of interest. 
 
37 For an empirical study showing an inverse relationship between IPO commissions and excess returns to 
investors using 1991-2002 UK data, see Ljungqvist [2003]. 
 
38 For example, following the 2003 Global Settlement and its widespread coverage in  the media, the 
proportion of “sell” recommendations rose abruptly, in the US from less than 1% in mid-2000 to about  
11% in mid-2003. In Europe the percentage of “sell” recommendations rose from 12% to 24% in Germany, 
from 13% to 21% in France, and from 6% to 16% in the UK over the same period. See “Your Stock Stinks, 
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But We Want the Dean,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2003. On the other hand, there was evidence that 
several of these same firms continued to engage in prohibited sales practices involving analysts outside the 
United States. See “Wall Street Accord Isn’t Global,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2003. 
 
39 Civil litigation can be an important component of market discipline and its reinforcement of regulatory 
sanctions. This was evident in the link between the release of the 2003 Global Settlement “findings of fact,” 
the prospects of large civil claims against the financial intermediaries and their corporate clients, and a $1 
billion restitution offer negotiated with some 300 companies issuing IPOs in the late 1990s – possibly to be 
recouped from subsequent civil settlements with the underwriters. Indeed, some of the entrepreneurial 
characteristics of US tort litigation can be regarded as an important aspect of market discipline relating to 
conflicts of interest. See “$1 Billion Offered to Settle Suit on IPOs,” The New York Times, June 27,  2003. 
However, by no means all civil suits are justified, as seen in a 2003 stinging rebuke to plaintiffs in a class 
action filed against Merrill Lynch by Judge Milton Pollack. Reuters, 2 July 2003. 
40 A prominent example of weak internal controls in a firm removed from market discipline is the former 
Prudential Insurance Company of America – since demutualized and renamed Prudential Financial. The 
firm’s securities affiliate, Prudential Securities, was fined $371 million (including $330 million in 
restitution) in 1993 for mis-selling limited partnerships. In 1996 Prudential was fined $65 million by state 
regulators for mis-selling life insurance policies, followed in 1997 by a $2.6 billion class action settlement 
on behalf of 640,000 clients. The firm was fined $20 million in 1999 by NASD for mis-selling variable life 
insurance, and censured (and fined $10,000) in 2001 by NASD for failing to enforce written policies 
regarding the sale of annuities. New probes on variable annuity sales practices were launched in 2003 and 
notified to NASD and state insurance commissioners. It can be argued that persistently misaligned internal 
incentives would have been a less serious problem if Prudential had been subject to market discipline all 
along. See Smith and Walter [2000] and “NASD Investigates Prudential, ”Wall Street Journal, May 30, 
2003. 
41As quoted in The New York Times, September 6, 2002. 
42Such conflicts of interest are particularly problematic in the mutual funds industry due to limited or non-
disclosure of fees, incentives and other compensation arrangements, revenue-sharing agreements, trading 
costs and soft-dollar commissions to brokers. 
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Wholesale Domain
Type-1 - Firm-client 
conflicts
• Principal transactions.
• Tying
• Misuse of fiduciary role
• Board interlocks. 
• Spinning
• Investor loans
• Self-dealing
• Front-running
Type-2 - Inter-client 
conflicts
• Misuse of private
information
• Client interest
incompatibility
Retail Domain
Type-1 - Firm-client 
conflicts
• Biased client advice
• Involuntary cross-selling
• Churning
• Inappropriate margin
lending
• Failure to execute
• Misleading disclosure and
reporting
• Violation of privacy
Exhibit 1
A Conflict of Interest Taxonomy
Domain-Transition Issues
Type-1 - Firm-client 
conflicts.
• Suitability
• Stuffing
• Conflicted research
• Spinning
• Late trading and market
timing                            
• Laddering
• Shifting bankruptcy risk
 
Indicative Matrix of Potential Conflicts of Interest
Commercial lender
Loan arranger
Debt underwriter
Equity underwriter
M&A advisor
Strategic financial advisor
Equity analyst
Debt analyst
Board member
Institutional asset manager
Insurer
Reinsurer
Clearance & settlement provider
Custodian
Deposit taker
Stockbroker
Life insurer
P&C insurer
Financial adviser
Mutual fund distributor
Commercial lender
Loan arranger
Debt underwriter
Equity underwriter
M&A advisor
Strategic financial advisor
Equity analyst
Debt analyst
Board member
Institutional asset manager
Insurer
Reinsurer
Clearance & settlement provider
Custodian
Deposit taker
Stockbroker
Life insurer
P&C insurer
Credit card issuer
Mutual fund distr.
Private banker
Transactions processor
Private banker
Retail lender
Credit card issuer
Retail lender
Financial adviser
Principal Investor / Trader
Transactions   processor
R
et
ai
l
W
ho
le
sa
le
A
B
E
D
C PI / T
U
til
iti
es
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Merrill Lynch Executives Nigeria Barge Repo Contract
LJM2 SPE
Private 
Investors
Personal
Investments
($16.7 MM)
Lender
($10mm)
Corporate finance 
advisory assignments
Pri-
vate
place-
ments
Securities underwriter
Energy derivatives counterparty
Principal
Investment 
($5 MM)
Equity
stake
Fees 1999-2001: Underwriting $20 million; Advisory $18 million; Fund raising ($265 million out of a total of 
$387 million for LJM2, 
Analyst
Exhibit 3
Multifunctional Conflicts of Interest: Merrill Lynch - Enron
Trades
 
Lender
Financial and
strategic adviser
Securities underwriter
Exclusive 
pension 
fund 
adviser
Analyst
Proprietary trader
Exhibit 4 
Multifunctional Conflicts of Interest: Citigroup - Worldcom
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Financial 
Services 
Firm
Supervisory
Applications
Static and 
Dynamic 
Efficiency 
Objectives
Regulatory
Techniques
Systemic 
Stability and 
Market Conduct 
Objectives
Exhibit 5
Regulatory Tradeoffs, Techniques and Control
 
J.P. Morgan
Securities, Inc.
& Subsidiaries
Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company
of New York
Corsair Fund, L.P.
Private 
Investors
1. Investor and 
General
Partner
2. Fund Manager
4. Corp. Finance
Advisory Assignments
5. Equity
Shareholding
($162 MM = 7.9%)
6. Credit
Relationship
3. Securities
Underwriter
($500 MM)
7. Board
RepresentationBanesto
Financial holdings
Nonfinancial holdings
Exhibit 6 
Measuring the Stock Price-Effects of Conflicts of Interest
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